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1U.S. – Hong Kong Relations:
Prospects for a Unique Partnership
Bates Gill and James Tang
A turbulent ten years 
 
Hong Kong has survived turbulent economic, social and political changes in the past ten years
since the former crown colony’s reversion to Chinese sovereignty. Following setbacks in the
wake of the Asian financial crisis and the avian flu outbreak in 1997, the outbreak of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and several massive political demonstrations in
recent years, Hong Kong’s economy has had a robust and steady rebound. Hong Kong has
maintained its position as a leading business and financial hub in the Asia-Pacific region and for
the world. It has continued to play a pivotal role in China’s economic development with
increasing economic and even social integration between the two. On the whole Hong Kong has
remained politically stable, and retains its title as one of the freest and most open economies in
the world.
On the other hand, while Hong Kong’s longstanding rule of law system is still widely
respected, the people’s aspiration for more democracy has not been fully met and concerns about
press freedom and civil rights have been raised by critics. Many observers have also argued that
the governance of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) will come under increasing stress
without further democratization. The pace and scope of Hong Kong’s political reforms remain
unresolved and the future of democratization in Hong Kong is still largely undetermined.
Given these developments, it is clear America has multiple interests in Hong Kong.
Senior American officials maintain that many of the qualities that turned Hong Kong into a
favorite destination for international business – a strong rule of law tradition, free flow of
information, respect for intellectual property rights – are also attributes that the United States
would like to see strengthened in the rest of China. As a leading port and a top financial center,
Hong Kong has also supported American efforts against global terrorism through the tightening
of port security and its leadership role in international anti-money laundering efforts. In addition,
continued progress in Hong Kong’s democratic development is widely viewed as consistent with
U.S. interests in more politically open and like-minded societies around the world. In late 2005,
then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick – stopping over in Hong Kong on his way to
Beijing – rightly noted his appreciation for the “special role that [Hong Kong] has to play as part
of China.”
However, in spite of these interests, Washington’s attention toward Hong Kong has been
uneven. Key political figures, from the former chairperson of the Democratic Party Martin Lee
and Christine Loh of Civic Exchange, a highly influential think tank, to senior officials including
the Chief Executive Donald Tsang and the Secretary for Justice Wong Yan-lung, have all visited
Washington in the recent past attempting to seek wider American support and understanding
regarding the process of democratization and other developments in Hong Kong.
 Bates Gill holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Washington, D.C. James Tang is an Associate Professor at The University of Hong Kong. The authors would like to
thank Melissa Murphy, Chin-hao Huang, and Savina Rupani for their outstanding contributions in the completion of
this report.
2Nonetheless, the March 2007 election for the leader of Hong Kong, the Chief Executive,
drew only limited attention in Washington. There was little news when Donald Tsang, the
incumbent and Beijing’s preferred candidate, won a large majority within the 800-member
Election Committee, which consisted of mainly Beijing loyalists tasked to select the new head of
the Hong Kong government. Notwithstanding the absence of direct elections by the people of
Hong Kong, it was the first election for the post contested by a pan-democratic camp candidate
and was seen by many in Hong Kong as an important step forward. As such, the muted response
in Washington was rather surprising.
Some of this is understandable. In light of the major foreign policy challenges – such as
with North Korea, Iraq, Sudan, Iran and other hotspots, as well as the complexity in U.S.-China
relations – facing the end of the Bush Administration’s second-term, it may not be realistic to
expect high-level attention to Hong Kong in Washington. And the next administration may
likewise believe it cannot afford to pay all that much attention to developments in Hong Kong.
Those of the “no news is good news” school may prefer it that way.
Yet, as Hong Kong stands at a political crossroads, and given its role in China’s
economic development, Washington’s interest in Hong Kong should be encouraged, renewed,
and sustained. Moreover, American attention should be broadened to recognize Hong Kong’s
strategic importance to U.S. interests including as a key player in countering terrorism and
playing a special role in China’s harmonious transformation at home and smooth integration
abroad.
Democratization in Hong Kong: Inching Forward? 
 
The Chief Executive of Hong Kong is now elected directly by an 800-member Election
Committee returned by indirect election with limited franchise. Only half of the 60-member
Legislative Council is elected directly through universal suffrage, with the remaining 30
“functional” constituency seats elected through a complicated system of indirect elections. The
Basic Law – Hong Kong’s mini-constitution – stipulates that both the Chief Executive and all
members of the Legislative Council will ultimately be elected by universal suffrage without
spelling out either a timetable or electoral system. The previous leader of Hong Kong, Tung
Chee-hwa, was elected after defeating other pro-Beijing contenders for the post in 1997 and was
returned unopposed in 2002. The 1998, 2000 and 2004 Legislative Council elections were
widely contested and conducted openly and fairly with the number of directly elected seats
increasing from 24 to 30 as stipulated by the Basic Law.
Following the reversion of Hong Kong in 1997, concerns about democratization took a
back seat to the city’s economic challenges, particularly the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the
subsequent economic downturn. However, in mid-2003, even as the economy began to show
signs of recovery, questions about Hong Kong’s political development rose to the fore when the
Hong Kong government decided to push ahead in introducing national security laws in
accordance with Article 23 in the Basic Law.
 Article 23 reads, in part: “The SAR shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition,
subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political
organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or
bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.” 
3The government’s Article 23 proposal was criticized by the legal profession, civil liberty
groups, and the broader public as poorly crafted and not based on adequate consultation with the
people of Hong Kong. Many feared that passing the legislation would place additional and
unnecessary restrictions on individual liberties, religious freedom, and freedom of speech. More
broadly, people in Hong Kong also took up their concerns with Article 23 as a means to express
their broader dissatisfaction with then-Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, who was often seen by
the pan-democratic camp as too willing to sacrifice Hong Kong’s special status under pressure
from China and reluctant to push for faster democratization against Beijing’s wishes. Hundreds
of thousands of peaceful protestors took to the streets in July 2003 and again a year later in a
remarkable outpouring of newfound political consciousness and unease.
These developments seemed to generate only lukewarm interest in Washington. In the
weeks just prior to the July 2003 demonstrations, the White House released a brief statement
expressing its reservations with Tung’s proposed legislation, but offered little else in support of
democratic developments in Hong Kong. The U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 – which
maintains that Washington will continue to promote economic prosperity and political autonomy
in Hong Kong after reversion – was not invoked or cited in support of greater democratization in
Hong Kong.
With widespread public discontent about the SAR government, Tung lost Beijing’s
confidence in his ability to govern and stepped down in April 2005. He was replaced rather
dramatically by Donald Tsang, who was then the number two person in the Hong Kong
government and the most senior career civil servant who also served the former British colonial
government.
Proposed reforms 
 
Shortly after assuming the Chief Executive post, Tsang visited Washington to explain the latest
proposed package of electoral reforms for selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and for forming
the Legislative Council in 2008. The proposal foresaw doubling the size of the Election
Committee for the Chief Executive, and increasing the number of Legislative Council seats from
Hong Kong’s Unique Governance Model
The Basic Law – Hong Kong’s mini-constitution – guarantees a high degree of autonomy to the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region for fifty years and enshrines the “one country, two systems” idea.
The Basic Law came out of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, negotiated between the United
Kingdom and China. The Basic Law claims that Hong Kong is “an inalienable part” of the People’s
Republic of China, but gives Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy and legislative and judicial rights
not shared by mainland Chinese. These include the right of Hong Kong courts to have the final say
over legal matters in the territory, the island’s right to continue having a capitalist economic system,
and the rights of Hong Kong residents to free speech, free assembly, and protection from unlawful
detention. Private property rights, limited voting rights, and human rights for citizens are also
protected in the Basic Law, among other “fundamental rights and freedoms.” Under the Basic Law,
except defense and foreign affairs, the Hong Kong government has control over other external issues
including trade and cultural matters.
Adapted from: “Hong Kong Pushes Beijing Back as Democracy Demands Continue,”
http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?breadcrumb=default&id=9374
4U.S. Position on Hong Kong’s
Democratization
The U.S. State Department has repeatedly
called for Hong Kong to achieve universal
suffrage as soon as possible. The U.S.-Hong
Kong Policy Act Report of 2005 stated that
Beijing’s April 2004 decision on electoral
reform and universal suffrage “severely
tested Hong Kong’s political autonomy.”
The decision taken by the National People’s
Congress appeared to “preempt local debate
on electoral reform and to rule out universal
suffrage in the 2007 Chief Executive and
2008 Legislative Council (LegCo)
elections.”
60 to 70 while maintaining the proportion of directly elected seats at half. These proposals still
fell short of demands from the pan-democratic camp for greater democracy in Hong Kong.
On the other side of the spectrum, Beijing found the proposals too far-reaching. The
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in Beijing made it clear that the
selection of the Chief Executive in 2007 and the Legislative Council members in 2008 would not
result from direct, universal suffrage elections by the people of Hong Kong, and has ruled out for
the time being a timetable for achieving universal suffrage or for increasing the ratio of directly-
elected to indirectly members of the Legislative Council. Moreover, when Chinese President Hu
Jintao met with Donald Tsang during the fall 2005 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
meeting in Busan, South Korea, he warned Tsang that no compromises would be made on issues
of direct elections or universal suffrage for the elections in 2007 and 2008.
Following that discussion, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, quoted Hu as pledging
“support for the Hong Kong government to develop a democratic system in a gradual manner
and according to the law” and that “in accordance with the Basic Law and the framework set by
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, and taking into account the overall
interests of Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity, Hong Kong people can engage in a rational
discussion and reach a consensus over Hong Kong’s political system and push for its
development in a gradual and steady manner.”1
As Hu’s remarks point out, it is important to understand the thin line the SAR walks in
seeking to expand democratization in Hong Kong. During his 2005 visit to the United States,
Tsang conceded that while he may personally support universal suffrage for Hong Kong, he must
operate within the special political circumstances of Hong Kong and its relationship with the
mainland. On the one hand, he pointed out that as a former civil servant during British colonial
rule and a devout Catholic, he was perhaps the “unlikeliest Communist-condoned leader in Hong
Kong.” On the other hand, he has vowed to adhere to Beijing’s pace for gradual democratization
in Hong Kong, and will not seek to push Hong Kong to the brink of political turmoil or radical
change. He wished to assure Washington that Hong Kong still enjoys a great deal of autonomy,
but must also demonstrate his loyalty to Beijing.
Washington now seems to better appreciate the nuances of political development in Hong
Kong. During Tsang’s visit, the State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack expressed
Washington’s “strong support for universal
suffrage in Hong Kong.” He commented that
direct elections could have been achieved for the
next round of Chief Executive and Legislative
Council elections in 2007 and 2008.
Acknowledging the political pressure Hong Kong
faces from Beijing, McCormack added, “The goal
of universal suffrage should be achieved soon, as
soon as possible. The people of Hong Kong
should determine the pace and scope of political
reform.”
In December 2005, without the support of
the pan-democratic camp, the government’s
proposed constitutional and electoral reform
package failed to gain the necessary two-thirds
5majority in the Legislative Council and was rejected, leaving the larger question of universal
suffrage for the people of Hong Kong, as guaranteed in the Basic Law, unresolved.
A contested election, but remaining concerns 
 
Against that background, Hong Kong’s first election for Chief Executive contested by a
candidate from the pan-democratic camp took place on March 25, 2007. Alan Leong, a Hong
Kong legislator and a leading member of the pro-democracy Civic Party, managed to receive
enough support for nomination by the Election Committee and ran against Donald Tsang. The
election even included two televised debates between the Tsang and Leong – an unprecedented
event in Hong Kong which drew over two million viewers. As expected, Tsang – who was
Beijing’s preferred candidate – won an overwhelming victory, gaining 649 of the 772 valid votes
cast by the Election Committee, or about 84 percent of the vote. Tsang will serve as Chief
Executive until 2012.
There remain a number of concerns in other areas of Hong Kong’s record of civil and
political rights. In July 2005, the Hong Kong Journalists’ Association released a report that
found increasing interference from Beijing in Hong Kong’s domestic affairs had a negative
impact on the territory’s freedom of speech. In its 2006 Annual Worldwide Press Freedom
Index, Reporters Without Borders downgraded Hong Kong from 39th in the previous year to 58th
place in its rankings. In September 2006, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women raised concerns about Hong Kong’s performance in several
important areas, including the low prosecution rate in domestic violence against women,
discriminatory government housing policies, and the consistent sub-par level of women’s
representation in politics since 1997, especially in Hong Kong’s functional constituencies.
In the run-up to the election for Chief Executive and shortly after his formal re-
appointment, Donald Tsang pledged that he would “resolve completely” the question of
universal suffrage election for the Chief Executive and the legislature during his second term. In
Recent Large-Scale Demonstrations for Democracy in Hong Kong
 July 1, 2003: 500,000 people turn out on the anniversary of Hong Kong’s reversion to express
opposition to Tung Chee-hwa and the proposed Article 23, and to demand greater democratic
reforms.
 January 1, 2004: 100,000 people protest on New Year’s Day.
 June 4, 2004: 80,000 people observe a candlelight vigil on the anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen Square incident.
 July 1, 2004: 500,000 people come out on the anniversary of Hong Kong’s reversion to protest
China’s decision to delay universal suffrage.
 July 1, 2005: 15,000 people demonstrate on the eighth anniversary of reversion.
 December 4, 2005: as many as 250,000 people were mobilized to demand a timetable for full
democracy.
 July 1, 2006: Estimates of 58,000 people took to the streets to demand labor rights and
universal suffrage.
Adapted from: “Hong Kong Pushes Beijing Back as Democracy Demands Continue,”
http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?breadcrumb=default&id=9374.
Note: estimates of participants in these demonstrations are contested and not exact. See for example,
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20040702_1.htm and http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20050702_4.htm.
6April 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao identified several key priorities for the second Tsang
Administration, which included “developing the economy, improving people’s lives, gradually
pushing forward democracy, and maintaining Hong Kong’s prosperity and social stability and
social harmony.” The Hong Kong government is expected to issue a Green Paper for public
consultation in mid-2007 which will lay out the options for constitutional reform, including the
question of universal suffrage, and how to move forward. As Stephen Lam, Hong Kong’s
Secretary for Constitutional Affairs, noted in May 2007, “The question now is not whether to
implement universal suffrage according to the Basic Law. The question is how and when.”2
However, critics in the pan-democratic camp are skeptical, and the debate about
democratic reforms continues. As such, Hong Kong political developments have entered a very
complex phase. The next Legislative Council election will be held in September 2008. Former
Chief Secretary Anson Chan, a respected political figure in Hong Kong, has publicly supported
the pan-democratic camp’s call for the introduction of universal suffrage as soon as possible.
They will no doubt call for faster democratization, but with a more popular Chief Executive and
a stronger economy, their ability to mobilize widespread public protests is questionable. In short,
ten years after the reversion of Hong Kong to China, democratization questions remain heated
and critical. Looking ahead, the government and people of Hong Kong will face a number of
critical junctures on the road toward greater democratization, developments which deserve closer
observation on the part of the United States and the international community.
Broader U.S. Interests in Hong Kong 
 
While attention to democratization in the SAR is surely important, Washington should also not
lose sight of broader interests the United States has in Hong Kong. To begin – and a matter that
is often overlooked – Hong Kong plays a critically important role in China’s economic
development as a source and conduit of investment into the mainland, including through, but not
limited to, the Hong Kong stock market, which has moved up three places to become the world’s
sixth largest in terms of capitalization. Hong Kong also plays a positive role in China’s
development through deepening social, cultural, and educational interactions and exchanges
between Hong Kong and mainland institutions in both official and unofficial levels.
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Hong Kong has also been an active supporter of Washington’s counterterrorism efforts.
The Hong Kong government apprehended two individuals in 2002 who were attempting to
transfer funds to purchase Stinger missiles for al-Qaeda. Hong Kong was in September 2002
among the first to join the Container Security Initiative (CSI) – an initiative aimed at the
World’s Busiest Container Ports:
A Comparison (2006)
1. Singapore 24.79 million TEU
2. Hong Kong 23.54 million TEU
3. Shanghai 21.71 million TEU
4. Shenzhen 18.47 million TEU
5. Busan 12.04 million TEU
6. Kaohsiung 9.77 million TEU
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prevention of shipments of weapons of mass destruction and illegal materials into U.S. ports.
The State Department further noted that in June 2004, tips provided through the CSI network
resulted in the seizure of three containers of counterfeit merchandise going from China to the
United States that were worth nearly $1.3 million – one of the largest counterfeit goods seizures
ever in Hong Kong. As of December 2006, both sides have been working on further refinement
and implementation of Washington’s Secure Freight Initiative, an upgrade to the “Megaports”
initiative, which involves the deployment of a combination of existing technology, proven
nuclear detection devices, and real-time alert system at Hong Kong’s port.
As the principal financial hub in Asia, Hong Kong has played an important role in
tracking and intercepting funding for terrorist networks internationally. The Legislative Council
passed legislation to comply with applicable United Nations anti-terror policies such as Security
Council Resolutions 1267, 1333, and 1373. In addition, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
recently established an Industry Working Group
on Anti-Money Laundering, which included key
representatives from over twenty institutions.
The State Department noted that the group further
convened three sub-groups to address terrorist
financing, transaction monitoring systems, and
private banking issues.
Hong Kong’s impressive economic
recovery and performance since 1997 has been
largely attributed to its ability to adapt and
transform into a liberal, open gateway city to
China, capitalizing on the mainland’s rapid growth. Within the past 10 years, both Hong Kong’s
trade with mainland China and the stock of FDI from Hong Kong in the mainland more than
doubled. The number of visitors also increased almost six times from 2.4 million to almost 14 by
the end of 2006. Despite setbacks, Hong Kong’s GDP growth averaged 5 percent between 1989
and 2006. It has deepening closer economic ties with the Pearl Delta River and concluded the
“Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between Hong Kong and the Chinese Mainland”
(CEPA) which became effective in January 2004. CEPA is consistent with World Trade
Organization rules and gives Hong Kong incorporated companies preferential access to mainland
Chinese markets. The elimination of tariffs against all Hong Kong-origin goods as well as
preferential treatment in 27 service sectors, lower trade barriers, and improved cross-border trade
infrastructure have enabled Hong Kong to remain competitive in the Asia-Pacific region.
These economic developments benefit the United States and are consistent with U.S.
interests. According to the U.S. State Department, there are some 1,100 American firms,
including 889 regional operations (295
regional headquarters and nearly 594 regional
offices), and about 54,000 U.S. citizens
resident in Hong Kong. In 2006, U.S.
Government statistics indicated that exports to
Hong Kong nearly reached $18 billion while
U.S. direct investment at the end of 2005 in
Hong Kong totaled nearly $38 billion, making
the U.S. one of the city’s largest investors,
along with China, the Netherlands, Japan, and
Taiwan. U.S. companies have a generally
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favorable view of Hong Kong’s friendly business environment, which includes an impartial legal
system, skilled workforce, low taxation, and sound infrastructure. The American Chamber of
Commerce further cited that nearly all of its respondents to a survey in December 2006 had a
“good” or “satisfactory” outlook for Hong Kong’s economy in 2007.
An important economic development in bilateral relations is the strengthening of Hong
Kong’s protection for intellectual property rights. Washington has worked closely with Hong
Kong to introduce effective legislation and policy to clamp down on illicit production of
copyrighted materials. The U.S. Trade Representative cites Hong Kong as a model for IPR
protection and urges other countries in the region to follow suit. Moreover, Hong Kong is
widely recognized as one of the freest economies in Asia. Even after the handover, Hong
Kong’s pro-market economic and trade systems continue, with free movement of goods and
capital, its status as a free port and separate customs territory, and its own customs boundary.
Both Hong Kong and the United States cooperate closely to assure that Hong Kong’s
economic freedoms do not allow for third parties – including mainland China – to gain illegal
access to dual use and other sensitive or proscribed technologies. U.S. Department of Commerce
representatives and Hong Kong authorities continue to carry out pre-license checks and post-
shipment verifications on companies in Hong Kong as part of the dual-use licensing, vetting, and
post-issuance process. Furthermore, both sides have also agreed to enhance the flow of
information on licensing and enforcement under the Agreed Minutes of Discussion on U.S.-
Hong Kong Strategic Commodities Trade Controls of 1997, addressing many of the goals
identified in the transshipment country export control initiative (TECI) of the U.S. Department of
Commerce.
On the downside, Hong Kong’s
continued economic success has led to
greater environmental concerns.
According to the American Chamber of
Commerce, a June 2006 poll of 140
business executives found that nearly
four out of five business leaders knew
someone who was planning on leaving
or has left Hong Kong as a result of
worsening air pollution and poor quality
of the environment. The survey further
9Chart obtained from: “The Big Wheeze,” The
Economist, March 29, 2007, accessed at
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.c
fm?story_id=8931753.
cited that 95 percent of respondents were “worried” about the potential long-term effects on their
health and their family’s health.
In November 2006, Civic Exchange, a
public policy think-tank, warned that much of Hong
Kong as well as the greater Pearl River Delta could
be hit by more severe and frequent floods if the
Hong Kong government fails to address the dangers
of climate change and global warming. The report
warned that a potential rise in sea level by a foot in
the next few decades could generate tides nearly 12
feet higher than current levels, which could
seriously affect much of the reclaimed, marshy land
in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has an obvious interest
in promoting solutions to address the challenges of
climate change, and is specially situated to work
closely with the United States in that pursuit in
Hong Kong, in China, and beyond.
Looking ahead 
 
Since Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty ten years ago, this unique city has weathered
turbulent times, defied predictions, and worked to redesign itself within the political and
economic realities it faces. A dynamic Hong Kong today suggests much change lies ahead in the
next ten years as its evolution continues.
The United States has a clear interest in how that future unfolds. Hong Kong and the
United States share an interest in upholding democratic values, safeguarding fundamental
principles of human rights, strengthening the rule of law, and bolstering fair and open markets,
all of which are vital for continued economic prosperity and stable political development, not
only in Hong Kong but around the world. As a special part of China, Hong Kong is well-
positioned to play a leading role in the positive economic, social, and political development of
the mainland. Moreover, Hong Kong, the United States and China all share an interest to see
Hong Kong remain prosperous and stable, and continue its unique role as a world city, a vibrant
hub for economic, financial, cultural, intellectual, and political exchange which contributes to the
future stability and prosperity in the region.
In looking forward to the next ten years, U.S.-Hong Kong relations call for far more
nuanced, multifaceted, informed, and sustained attention by the United States to realize these
important and jointly shared interests.
1
“Take it or leave it, Hu tells SAR over reform,” The Standard, November 19, 2005, accessed at:
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_cat=4&art_id=5997&sid=5550048&con_type=1&d_str=20051119.
2 See “SCA speaks after Commission on Strategic Development workshop,” May 10, 2007, accessed at:
http://www.cpu.gov.hk/english/documents/csd/csd_press100507sca.pdf.
3 Data in the graphs and charts throughout the monograph on Hong Kong’s economic performance have been
obtained from the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office and the Baihua Foundation Research Centre.

